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Europeanization Mechanisms and Process Tracing:  




While the literature on Europeanization has exhibited considerable awareness of the 
methodological challenge of establishing causal relations between non-binding EU 
stimuli and domestic change, less work has been done on how this challenge might be 
met. This article contributes to the literature’s attempts to meet this challenge by: i) 
reformulating four explanations of Europeanization based on four distinct causal 
mechanisms (instrumental learning, social learning, naming and shaming and peer 
pressure), ii) specifying their observable implications for three intervening steps 
between EU stimuli and change in national policy (the definition of the policy 
problem, the alternative courses of action considered and the manner in which they 
were assessed), iii) defending process tracing against critiques of its usefulness for 
research on Europeanization and iv) providing practical guidelines on how process 
tracing can be used to test these four explanations empirically, using examples from 
employment policy, where non-binding EU stimuli feature most prominently. 
 
Keywords: Europeanization; mechanisms; process tracing; causality; employment 
policy.  
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Introduction 
It has become commonplace to state that establishing causality in the literature 
on Europeanization is a challenge, especially for researchers who attempt to establish 
causal relations between non-binding European Union (EU) stimuli and change in 
national policy (cf. Featherstone, 2003; Haverland, 2006; Radaelli, 2012). While a 
sizeable part of the literature has exhibited considerable awareness of this challenge, 
less work has been done on how it might be met. In the small part of the literature that 
has attempted to address this issue, it has become equally commonplace to argue that 
process tracing might be used to establish the causal significance of the EU 
(Moumoutzis, 2011; Radaelli, 2006; Zartaloudis, 2013). Process tracing is a within-
case2 qualitative method that ‘attempts to identify the intervening … causal 
mechanism between an independent variable … and the outcome of the dependent 
variable’ (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 206). Its attempt to identify causal 
mechanisms is typically considered process tracing’s distinguishing feature (Beach 
and Pedersen, 2013, p. 1).  
While the use of this method in the literature on Europeanization has been 
widespread, it has not been particularly advanced. It has been consistent with what has 
been termed ‘detailed narratives’ that make limited use of theory (George and 
Bennett, 2005, pp. 210-1). Simply put, researchers frequently merely mention process 
tracing and then present a historical narrative of relevant EU- and domestic-level 
developments. Regardless of the amount of detail that they include, these narratives 
often do not succeed in establishing the causal significance of the EU.  
This is regrettable given the progress that the literature on within-case 
qualitative methods has made since the mid-1990s (see Bennett and Elman, 2006 and 
                                                 
2 As has been pointed out (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 462), many small-n studies have been 
presented as comparisons, while in fact they use process tracing to make within-case causal inferences. 
Mahoney, 2007; for process tracing in particular see Bennett and Checkel, 2015). This 
shortcoming is not inherent in process tracing, as this method is consistent with more 
advanced analyses that make extensive use of hypotheses and variables. Thus, the 
challenge for researchers is to transform these narratives into ‘analytical explanations’ 
(George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 211-12). The intervening steps between cause and 
effect, on which process tracing focuses, should be ‘theoretically predicted’ (Checkel, 
2006, p. 636). Additionally, an ‘uninterrupted’ causal path between cause and effect is 
required and ‘it is not sufficient that a hypothesis be consistent with a statistically 
significant number of intervening steps’ (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 207).3 The 
causal path might be interrupted if relevant theories make no predictions about a 
certain intervening step or an indeterminacy problem might arise if they make similar 
predictions (George and Bennett, 2005). As has been pointed out (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 
173-174), process tracing per se cannot eliminate the potential for such indeterminacy. 
Consequently, it is necessary to hypothesise observable implications for the 
intervening steps between cause and effect that are as distinctive as possible.  
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the literature’s attempts to meet 
the challenge of establishing the causal significance of the EU, especially in policy 
areas where EU stimuli are not binding.4 It does so by reformulating four explanations 
                                                 
3 For example, while evidence that non-binding EU stimuli have caused changes in the definition of 
policy problems has been reported, there is not as much evidence that these changes have been 
followed by changes in the alternative courses of action that national policy makers considered or 
changes in the way in which these alternatives were assessed before the decision to change policy was 
made. Consequently, the evidence that has been reported has been insufficient to establish an 
uninterrupted causal path between cause and effect (cf. Zeitlin, 2005). For these intervening steps, see 
below.  
4 We refer to these EU stimuli as ‘non-binding’ in the sense that they are not justiciable. We prefer to 
refrain from using the term ‘soft’ EU law because of the problems related to the distinction between 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law that the literature has identified (see Trubek and Trubek, 2005). Additionally, the 
terms that we use here have clearer implications for the causal mechanisms through which 
Europeanization might produce policy change. As the Commission cannot bring charges of non-
compliance with non-justiciable EU stimuli before the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the ECJ cannot 
enforce compliance with such stimuli by imposing sanctions. Finally, it should be noted that the 
analysis presented here also applies to policy areas where binding EU stimuli are available, yet unlikely 
to be adopted due to divergent national preferences (see Radaelli, 2008, p. 239). 
of Europeanization based on four distinct causal mechanisms: 1) instrumental 
learning, 2) social learning, 3) naming and shaming and 4) peer pressure.  Such 
mechanism-based explanations ‘detail the cogs and wheels of the causal process 
through which the outcome to be explained was brought about’ (Hedström and 
Ylikoski, 2010, p. 50). The analysis here also specifies the observable implications of 
the aforementioned mechanism-based explanations for three intervening steps 
between cause and effect: 1) the definition of the policy problem, 2) the alternative 
courses of action considered and 3) the manner in which the latter were assessed. The 
analysis of these observable implications renders these explanations amenable to an 
advanced application of process tracing.  
The first part of the article presents the aforementioned mechanism-based 
explanations. These explanations depart from conventional analyses of the causal 
mechanisms on which they are based. While the literature often conflates various 
mechanisms into one, this article argues that it is problematic to equate ‘naming and 
shaming’ with ‘peer pressure’ and ‘social learning’ with ‘socialization’. The 
systematic distinction between different causal mechanisms allows us to formulate 
explanations of Europeanization that are theoretically more coherent and easier to test 
empirically.  
The second part of the article defends process tracing against critiques of its 
usefulness for research on Europeanization. It is argued that those who have 
advocated random selection on the independent variable as the most effective way of 
establishing causality have disregarded the fact that cases of Europeanization are 
cases of equifinality, to which the use of process tracing is better suited. It is also 
argued that the generalizability of findings depends on case selection rather than the 
use of process tracing. 
The third part of this article demonstrates how process tracing might be 
applied empirically using examples from employment policy, where the use of non-
binding EU stimuli has been extensive (see Heidenreich and Bischoff, 2008; Van Rie 
and Marx, 2012; Zartaloudis, 2013). While this part of the article does not present 
findings of an empirical case study, it does provide detailed practical guidelines on the 
use of process tracing.  
 
 
I. FOUR EXPLANATIONS OF EUROPEANIZATION AND THEIR 
OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS 
Several mechanisms of Europeanization in policy areas with non-binding EU 
stimuli have been identified in the literature (cf. Trubek and Trubek, 2005). 
Nevertheless, none has been specified with a degree of precision that would render 
them empirically testable through process tracing. As has been recently pointed out 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 30), before employing process tracing it is necessary 
to specify as precisely as possible what one should observe within a case in order to 
empirically substantiate each hypothesised explanation. This section serves this 
purpose by presenting four explanations of Europeanization based on four distinct 
causal mechanisms (instrumental learning, social learning, naming and shaming and 
peer pressure) and specifying their observable implications.5 Mechanisms are 
conceptualised here as 'entities' and the 'activities', in which they engage and which 
produce particular types of change (Hedström, 2005, p. 25; Machamer et al., 2000, p. 
3). As has often been the case (Hedström, 2005, p. 2), the 'entities' and 'activities', on 
which the analysis focuses, are actors and their actions. In each of the four 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that further operationalisation of the explanations presented here is likely to be 
necessary once a specific case has been selected. 
explanations presented here, the analysis of different actions exhibits a 'productive 
continuity' (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3) between the same cause (non-binding EU 
stimuli) and the same effect (change in national policy).6   
As has been pointed out (Hall, 2008, p. 27), it is particularly important to 
derive ‘predictions that are consistent with one theory but inconsistent with its 
principal rivals’. In this vein, the analysis here increases the level of 'theoretical 
uniqueness' of each explanation's observable implications (the extent to which they 
can be derived from only one of these four explanations in principle) and the extent to 
which they are mutually exclusive.7 At least one of the observable implications of 
each explanation is both theoretically unique and incompatible with the observable 
implications of the other explanations for the same intervening step between cause 
and effect. Finally, this section argues that discourse (in the sense of a process that 
serves to disseminate policy ideas) is more useful for explaining the Europeanization 
of domestic politics rather than national policies. 
 
Instrumental and social learning 
Policy learning has been the most popular explanation of policy change as the 
outcome of Europeanization (Borrás and Radaelli, 2010; Kröger, 2009; Zeitlin, 2005). 
Policy learning is understood here as ‘relatively enduring changes in thought or 
behavioural intention that result from experience and/or new information concerned 
                                                 
6 For a framework that considers non-binding EU stimuli’s effects other than change in national policy 
see Zeitlin et al. (2014). 
7 For the term 'theoretical uniqueness' see Rohlfing (2014, p. 614), who has refined Van Evera's (1997, 
p. 31) conception of 'uniqueness'. It should be noted here that a complete discussion of observable 
implications would also require an assessment of their ‘empirical uniqueness’ (the extent to which the 
observable implications of one or more than one of these four explanations can be tested in a specific 
case) and their 'certainty' (the probability that they will be confirmed). As Rohlfing (2014, pp. 613-4) 
has pointed out, this can only be determined in relation to a particular case and therefore it is not 
possible within the confines of this article.  
with the attainment or revision of policy objectives’ (Heclo, 1974, p. 306).8 While 
various types of learning have been discussed in the literature, we argue that the 
distinction between ‘instrumental’ and ‘social learning’ is more useful for empirical 
research because it produces observable implications that allow researchers to 
distinguish between them empirically. As was mentioned above, the extent to which 
causal arguments make distinctive predictions about intervening steps between cause 
and effect should be a guiding principle in the process of refining causal mechanisms. 
In this vein, during EU-level interactions national policy makers acquire new 
information drawn from the experience of other EU member-states, assess it and if 
they calculate that practices originally pursued elsewhere might achieve their policy 
goals more effectively they voluntarily incorporate them into their policy. This type of 
learning has been referred to as ‘instrumental’, ‘single-loop’ or ‘adaptive’ learning 
and it results in a change in policy means (Argyris and Shön, 1978, p. 20-26; May, 
1992, p. 335; Visser, 2005, p. 180). In contrast, ‘social’, ‘double-loop’ or ‘reflexive’ 
learning results in a change in policy ends, as the information that national policy 
makers acquire and assess is not merely related to policy instruments, but also policy 
objectives.9 The causal significance of the EU in this case lies in the fact that it is the 
channel through which new information becomes available to national policy makers, 
                                                 
8 See also Sabatier (1987, p. 654). Hall has defined ’social learning’ as ’a deliberate attempt to adjust 
the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience or new information’ (1993, p. 278). In 
this sense, ‘learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process’. As Bennett and 
Howlett (1992, p. 285) have pointed out, this assumption is fairly common amongst explanations of 
policy change based on learning. Surely, however, it is conceivable that certain policy makers might 
learn and intend or even attempt to pursue policy change, yet they might fail to convince or impose the 
lessons they have learnt on their colleagues. Furthermore, if these policy makers have complete 
information at the early stages of the policy-making process, they are likely to anticipate this outcome 
and therefore they may not attempt to pursue policy change. Consequently, Hall’s definition is too 
restrictive as it excludes cases of learning, where the latter is not followed by (attempts to pursue) 
policy change.  
9 The outcomes of instrumental learning are consistent with what Hall (1993) refers to as first- and 
second-order change, while the outcomes of social learning are consistent with third-order change. 
which in turn modifies national policy makers’ conception of the policy problem 
(social learning) or the range of alternatives available to them (instrumental learning).  
Instrumental learning is a common element of rationalist explanations of 
policy change (Dobbin et al. 2007, p. 463; James and Lodge, 2003, p. 181; Risse et al. 
2001, p. 12). According to the latter, (national) policy makers use ‘at some later point’ 
the information that they have acquired during (EU-level) interactions ‘to alter 
strategies, but not preferences, which are given’ (Checkel, 2001, p. 561). Such 
explanations predict that national policy makers calculate the costs and benefits of 
EU-recommended courses of action in terms of policy objectives, not the objective of 
re-election. In the case of social learning, these cost-benefit calculations are made in 
terms of policy objectives, which have previously been redefined upon reflection on 
information relating to the nature of the policy problem. 
 
Naming and shaming 
‘Naming and shaming’ and ‘peer pressure’ have also featured prominently in 
the literature. The precise relationship between these two mechanisms remains 
unclear. The literature uses them practically interchangeably to refer to the negative 
implications for national policy makers whose country is under-performing with 
regard to indicators jointly agreed upon at the EU level (see for example Hodson, 
2004; Zeitlin, 2005). National policy makers, it is argued, pursue policy change in 
response to non-binding EU stimuli in order to avoid the ‘informal sanction’ of 
naming and shaming or the pressure of their peers (Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008, p. 
504; Trubek and Trubek, 2005, p. 357).  
This article departs from conventional analyses of naming and shaming and 
peer pressure and argues that they constitute distinct causal mechanisms. Naming and 
shaming can form the basis of a rationalist explanation of policy change, whereas peer 
pressure is only consistent with a constructivist approach. The key distinguishing 
feature of naming and shaming is the publicity that its effective functioning requires.10  
In this sense, evaluations of national performance that are made public are expected to 
embarrass national governments who are found to have performed badly and result in 
reputational losses, as they are available for opposition parties, interest groups and the 
media to use in their discourse (Büchs, 2008; De Ruiter, 2013; Hodson, 2004; Zeitlin, 
2005).11 Such reputational losses may in turn result in electoral losses. This causal 
argument is based on the premise that the electorate is both informed about these 
evaluations and willing to electorally punish a government, under which their country 
has performed badly.12 While the ‘cost/benefit choice mechanism’ (Checkel, 2001, p. 
556) is the same as in the explanation based on instrumental learning, the type of cost-
benefit calculations is different. Consequently, researchers can empirically test this 
mechanism by investigating the type of cost-benefit calculations that national policy 
                                                 
10 It appears as though the conflation of these two mechanisms originated in Hodson’s analysis, which 
remains the most detailed. Strikingly, Hodson drew on Olson’s analysis of social pressure, which has 
made explicit that two distinct ‘kind(s) of social pressure may occasionally be operative’ (Olson, 1971, 
p. 63, fn 18). One type of social pressure is generated ‘through person-to-person friendships’, while the 
other ‘through mass media’ (Olson, 1971, p. 63, fn 18). We believe that our distinction between an 
explanation based on naming and shaming, which occurs in public, and an explanation based on peer 
pressure, which occurs in private, is more consistent with Olson’s analysis. 
11 Empirical evidence shows that the formulation of country-specific recommendations that follows the 
evaluation of national performance is ‘a politically negotiated process…between the Commission and 
the Member States’ (Copeland and Ter Haar, 2013, p. 31). The member states try to influence the 
wording of the Commission’s recommendations or to have (parts of) recommendations removed and 
occasionally they succeed (Copeland and Ter Haar, 2013, p. 32; Mailand, 2008, p. 356, 358-9). It does 
not follow, however, that ‘recommendations are therefore quasi-extensions of the Member States acting 
in areas they themselves identify as a priority’ (Copeland and Ter Haar, 2013, p. 32). If the member 
states could exercise such control over the recommendations, they would be fairly responsive to them. 
The evidence, however, shows that responsiveness to recommendations is variable, yet overall rather 
limited (see Copeland and Ter Haar, 2013, p. 30-1). Consequently, while the member states regularly 
try to and occasionally succeed in influencing the Commission’s recommendations, the latter remain 
beyond their full control and are more than a mere reflection of national priorities. 
12 Although Zeitlin (2005) does not specify the reasons why a national government would prefer to 
avoid such ‘embarrassment’, Hodson (2004, p. 239) and Büchs (2008, p. 24) refer to naming and 
shaming’s negative implications for ‘a government’s credibility in the eyes of the electorate’ and 
‘election turnout’ respectively. We argue that these implications are unlikely to provide sufficient 
incentive for policy change because they fall short of electoral punishment. The scope condition for the 
effective operation of this particular mechanism should be more restrictive: voters should be willing to 
electorally punish their government for bad performance. 
makers made before pursuing policy change. Establishing that the EU was causally 
significant via naming and shaming requires evidence that national policy makers 
calculated the electoral costs of the continuation of the policy previously pursued.13 
 
Peer pressure 
In contrast to naming and shaming, peer pressure does not require publicity, but the 
‘political determination of (EU) member-states to use (it) … against recalcitrant 
countries’ (Radaelli, 2000, p. 34). National policy makers must be willing to highlight 
discrepancies between the behavioural norms of their community (the EU) and the 
behaviour of their peers and they must be willing to exert pressure on their peers to 
change their behaviour. Furthermore, national policy makers ‘must consider a peer 
rebuke…to be costly’ (Hodson, 2004, p. 240). It remains unclear, however, why they 
might consider such pressure costly and yield to it. It has been suggested that 
socialization ‘would certainly enhance the impact of peer pressure on domestic policy 
choices’ (Radaelli, 2003b, p. 54, fn 20). In fact, a recent review of the relevant 
literature concluded that 'socialization for governmental actors’ has been the main 
effect of non-justiciable EU stimuli on welfare states, even though ‘they are the ones 
that are least willing to use it to reflect upon how to alter problem and/or solution 
framing in the process of ongoing welfare state reform’ (De la Porte and Pochet, 
2012, p. 343). In this case, the term socialization has been used rather lightly. If 
national policy makers are not even willing to consider alternative definitions of 
policy problems or policy solutions presented during EU-level interactions, they have 
                                                 
13 Naming and shaming does not make information available only to domestic actors, but also to 
financial markets (see Hodson, 2004, p. 239). In cases, where this information has implications for an 
EU member-state’s creditworthiness, it might be the response of the financial markets that causes 
change in national policy. Such a causal relation will also be reflected in national policy makers’ cost-
benefit calculations that precede policy change, as it will increase the financial cost of the policy 
previously pursued. 
hardly been socialised. Socialization is ‘a process of inducting actors into the norms 
and rules of a given community’ (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). The nature of this process is 
highly transformative. According to constructivist approaches, with which this 
mechanism is consistent (Checkel, 2001, p. 557), once these norms and rules have 
been internalised, actors are driven by a logic of appropriateness, namely by 
considerations of what constitutes normal, right or good behaviour within the context 
of a given community (March and Olsen, 2004). In the case of the EU, socialised 
national policy makers under peer pressure become convinced14 that it is appropriate 
for them to comply with EU recommendations that would enable their country to 
achieve EU goals. Under such conditions, national policy makers should be expected 
to yield to the pressure of their peers.15 Consequently, establishing that the EU was 
causally significant via peer pressure requires evidence that national policy makers 
did not make cost-benefit calculations, but attempted to identify the appropriate 
course of action for a member of their community (the EU). 
The precise relationship between socialization and social learning has thus far 
remained unclear, presumably because both explanations predict change in policy 
goals. In certain formulations socialization and social learning do not appear to 
constitute separate mechanisms.16 This article argues that their usefulness will be 
maximised if they remain distinct. Learning by definition requires the provision and 
                                                 
14 Checkel (2001) uses the term ‘social learning’ to refer to this mechanism that entails ‘persuasion’ 
and ‘convincing someone through argument’. As was mentioned above, we follow May (1992) and 
retain the use of the term ‘social learning’ for cases, where actors reflect on information relating to the 
policy problem itself.  
15 There might be a set of cases, in which national policy makers should be expected to yield to the 
pressure of their peers even in the absence of socialisation. It is plausible to argue that this might be the 
case in member states, where a national ‘compliance culture’ prevails and compliance per se takes 
precedence over other goals. According to the worlds-of-compliance typology (see Falkner et al. 2007, 
p. 405), this is the case in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, which belong to the ‘world of law 
observance’. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the empirical record of this approach is at best 
mixed. See amongst others Thomson (2009, p. 14), who used ‘exactly the same data’ as Falkner et al. 
(2007), but reached ‘starkly different conclusions’. 
16 Radaelli (2008, p. 240), for example, has argued that Europeanization may entail ‘learning by 
socialisation’, which ‘make(s) policy makers more aware of their interdependence and can inspire more 
commitment towards EU-level goals’.  
assessment of new information. Initially, socialization will indeed entail learning, as 
new members of a community will first be required to learn what the community’s 
norms and rules are. Subsequently, however, socialization will require normative 
arguments, which will demonstrate discrepancies between national policy and EU 
rules and which will not necessarily be based on new information. 
 
Discourse 
Discourse has also been considered a mechanism through which Europeanization 
produces domestic change. As will be shown below, while there are analyses of 
discourse, which are useful for research on Europeanization, these analyses tell us 
more about the Europeanization of domestic politics rather than national policies.  It 
has been argued (Trubek and Trubek, 2005, p. 92) that ‘discursive transformations’ 
may explain policy change as national policy makers that make use of concepts 
introduced at the EU level ‘tend to shift policy orientation’. Others have implicitly 
suggested fairly specific causal and temporal sequences. In these analyses, discourse 
is understood as ‘both the policy ideas that speak to the soundness and 
appropriateness of policy programmes and the interactive processes of policy 
formulation and communication that serve to generate and disseminate those policy 
ideas’ (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004, p. 193). Moreover, discourse has been identified 
both as a dependent variable that Europeanization might affect and as an intervening 
variable that affects the likelihood of the Europeanization of national policies (see 
Radaelli 2003a, pp. 36, 49). In this sense, discourse as a set of ideas is initially 
Europeanised and subsequently discourse as a process that serves to disseminate these 
ideas facilitates the Europeanization of national policies. This article argues that the 
first part of this sequence cannot be analytically separated from learning. If discourse 
as a set of ideas is related to policy instruments, the Europeanization of discourse will 
be the result of instrumental learning. If it is related to policy objectives, it will be the 
result of social learning. 
The second part of this sequence appears more promising. Information 
acquired during EU-level interactions might be used as a political resource to 
construct a discourse – in the sense of a process that serves to disseminate policy ideas 
– that might serve various purposes: present a policy problem as a legitimate addition 
to the agenda or prioritise a problem that is already on the agenda, serve to check 
domestic pressure for a policy solution by providing one in a time-efficient fashion or 
it might serve to legitimate a policy solution that has already been selected (Bennett, 
1991; Graziano et al., 2011; Lopez-Santana, 2006). On the one hand, ‘coordinative 
discourse’17 (the use of ideas by policy actors in their attempts to coordinate 
agreement on policies) results in change in the preferences of (some of) the actors that 
participate in the policy-making process. On the other, ‘communicative discourse’ 
(the use of ideas by political actors in their attempts to communicate to the public the 
policy programme agreed upon in the context of coordinative discourse) results in 
change in mass public opinion. As Europeanised ideas become shared by a larger 
number of domestic actors and/or the public, reform capacity is enhanced, thus 
rendering policy change more likely (Schmidt, 2002, p. 900). In such cases of usage 
of EU resources in domestic discourse, no change in the definition of the policy 
problem or the alternative courses of action considered should be observable. In fact, 
this process is more accurately conceptualised as the Europeanization of domestic 
politics rather than national policies.  
 
                                                 
17 For the distinction between ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’ discourse see Schmidt and Radaelli 
(2004). 
II. IN DEFENCE OF PROCESS TRACING FOR RESEARCH ON 
EUROPEANIZATION 
Process tracing is not without its critics in the literature on Europeanization. 
This section draws on the broader literature on process tracing in order to address 
these critiques and defend the usefulness of process tracing for establishing causality 
in research on Europeanization. According to Haverland (2006, pp. 137-8), process 
tracing is unlikely to allow researchers to establish the causal significance of the EU 
regardless of whether the observable implications of alternative explanations that do 
not attribute causal significance to the EU are also process traced. In this vein, the 
problem lies in developments, such as globalisation, which occurred in parallel with 
European integration, and produce similar effects (Haverland 2006, p. 137). In 
contrast to most of the literature on Europeanization, Haverland (2006, pp. 135-6, 
139) has suggested that establishing the causal significance of the EU requires a 
comparison between EU member-states and non-members in order to introduce 
variation in the independent variable.  
This critique disregards crucial differences between qualitative and 
quantitative research.  More precisely, Haverland has suggested research strategies 
that are better suited to quantitative research for a literature that is predominantly 
qualitative. Indeed, random selection on the independent variable is one of the 
distinguishing features of quantitative research (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, pp. 239-
41). Qualitative researchers, however, typically select positive cases on the dependent 
variable (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, pp. 239-41).  
Furthermore, Haverland’s critique disregards the notion of equifinality – the 
idea that there are multiple causal paths to the same outcome – which has been 
identified as an integral part of the understanding of causality in qualitative research 
(Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, pp. 236-7).18 It should be made explicit that 
distinguishing the causal significance of the EU from that of other factors does not 
require researchers to establish that the substantive content of EU stimuli is unique. 
Indeed, as the use of non-binding stimuli is often intended to spread best practice, the 
EU by definition promotes policies which are already being pursued by certain 
national governments. Similarly, national governments in powerful bargaining 
positions might determine the outcome of EU policy-making on specific policy issues 
and impose national policy as EU policy, in which case the EU will again promote 
policies that are already being pursued by certain national governments. Finally, the 
EU might make policy recommendations that are similar to those made by 
international organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development or the International Monetary Fund, which might also result in domestic 
change independently of the EU.  
It follows from the above that the outcomes of Europeanization may also be 
produced by other factors either at the domestic or the international level and 
therefore cases of Europeanization are cases of equifinality. If the substantive content 
of EU stimuli and the outcomes of Europeanization were unique, one would merely 
need to observe the outcomes that are unique to this process in order to safely 
conclude that this process has occurred. The existence of alternative sources of policy 
ideas and practices suggests that research questions related to Europeanization are 
indeed puzzling and worth exploring. The fact that cases of Europeanization are cases 
of equifinality suggests that ‘the statement that the EU causes a particular outcome’ 
does not ‘(imply) that if the EU were to absent (sic) that particular outcome would not 
occur’ (Haverland, 2006, p. 135) precisely because other developments might also 
                                                 
18 Strikingly, Haverland’s discussion of globalisation implicitly acknowledges that cases of 
Europeanization are cases of equifinality, yet his definition of causality does not. 
produce it. Similarly, equifinality renders evidence of similar domestic changes in 
both EU member-states and non-members insufficient to establish that the EU is not 
causally significant for changes in its member-states. Domestic change in non-
members may indeed be the effect of causes other than the EU, such as globalisation 
or a newly elected government’s reform agenda. Such evidence, however, does not 
suffice to establish that similar domestic changes have been produced through the 
same causal path in all cases.  
Given that cases of Europeanization are cases of equifinality, within-case 
methods, which establish causality by determining the causal mechanism through 
which an outcome has been produced (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 459), are 
particularly important for empirical research on Europeanization. As has been pointed 
out, given that such methods do not establish causality through comparison, they are 
‘not susceptible to selection bias’ (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 461). Thus, the 
literature’s emphasis on process tracing is justified because the latter is precisely such 
a method that makes it possible to establish whether the EU has been causally 
significant.19 It also makes it possible to determine the mechanism through which 
Europeanization has produced policy change, as the intervening steps between cause 
and effect, on which process tracing focuses, provide ‘diagnostic pieces of evidence’ 
that can (dis)confirm alternative explanations (Bennett, 2010).  
It has also been argued - ironically by process tracers themselves (Checkel, 
2006, p. 367)20 - that the findings of research based on within-case qualitative 
methods, such as process tracing are problematic because they are not generalizable. 
On the one hand, the scope for generalizability is indeed typically narrower in 
                                                 
19 This is not to suggest that comparison is not useful, but only that Haverland argues that it can resolve 
a problem (selection bias), from which process tracing does not suffer. 
20 It should be noted that Checkel appears to have modified his position on this issue in his more recent 
work – see (Bennett and Checkel, 2015: 13-14, 29). 
qualitative research because its complex conception of causality directs it towards 
different research goals (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, p. 237-8). On the other hand, 
this critique should not be overstated. Generalizability does not depend on the method 
per se, but on a different element of research design: case selection. For example, if 
process tracing produced no evidence of Europeanization in a case where all or at 
least most of the conditions that render Europeanization likely were present - that is in 
a most-likely critical case of Europeanization - it would be safe to conclude that 
causal arguments regarding Europeanization have been substantially weakened and 
should be revised or abandoned. In other words, methodologically sound case 
selection ensures the generalizability of findings produced through process tracing, 
not process tracing per se. 
 
III. HOW TO PROCESS TRACE THE OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE FOUR EXPLANATIONS OF EUROPEANIZATION 
Despite the usefulness of process tracing for establishing causality in research 
on Europeanization, little work has been done on the precise intervening steps, on 
which it should focus. Following Moumoutzis (2011), we argue that process tracing 
should focus on the following dimensions of the policy-making process: 1) the 
definition of the policy problem, 2) the alternative courses of action considered and 3) 
the manner in which the latter were assessed. These intervening steps have been 
selected because they are the ones, for which the observable implications of the four 
explanations presented above are most easily distinguishable21. As was mentioned 
above, the preceding analysis increased the level of 'theoretical uniqueness' of at least 
                                                 
21 While we only have enough space here to cover explanations that attribute causal significance to the 
EU, researchers should also identify the observable implications of explanations that do not attribute 
causal significance to the EU for the same intervening steps. On selecting sources, generating data 
relevant to these intervening steps from them and drawing inferences from this data see among others 
Bennett and Checkel (2015, pp. 27-29, 31-32) and Rohlfing (2012, especially chapters 7 and 8). 
one of the observable implications of each explanation for these intervening steps and 
the extent to which they are mutually exclusive, thus facilitating empirical testing..  
As a first step, empirical research should establish how national policy makers 
defined the policy problem that they intended to address22. Evidence of this dimension 
of the policy-making process has diagnostic value, as different explanations have 
different observable implications for this dimension. Explanations based on peer 
pressure and social learning predict changes in national policy makers’ definition of 
the policy problem and their policy objectives, while explanations based on 
instrumental learning and naming and shaming do not.  
 Consider employment policy. Both the Commission and the Council have 
identified problems, which national employments policies should address, such as low 
female employment rates or labour market segmentation (Commission, 2010; 2013; 
Council of the European Union, 2010). It can be hypothesized that if the EU can 
effectively induce change in its member-states’ employment policies, national policy 
makers will begin to identify low female employment rates and labour market 
segmentation as problems that their policy should address. While explanations based 
on instrumental learning or naming and shaming cannot explain such changes because 
they predict no variation in the definition of the policy problem, the explanation based 
on social learning predicts that national policy makers will begin to consider low 
female employment rates and labour market segmentation as employment policy 
problems after collecting relevant information during EU-level interactions. 
Alternatively, the explanation based on peer pressure predicts that during EU-level 
interactions national policy makers will become convinced that continuing to 
                                                 
22 It should be noted here that there might be cases, where one or more policy makers made calculations 
different from those of the majority of their colleagues. Empirical testing of the explanations presented 
above requires empirical evidence of the calculations that dominated the policy-making process in each 
intervening step between cause and effect. See also footnote 7 on this point. 
disregard low female employment rates and labour market segmentation as 
employment policy problems would undermine the EU’s ability to achieve its goals. If 
empirical research shows no such changes in the definition of the policy problem, 
their absence should be considered disconfirming evidence for both the explanation 
based on social learning and the explanation based on peer pressure. 
Subsequently, researchers should identify the various alternative courses of 
action that national policy makers considered. While evidence of this particular 
dimension of the policy-making process does not allow researchers to distinguish 
between alternative mechanisms of Europeanization, it has diagnostic value for the 
distinction between explanations that attribute causal significance to the EU and 
explanations that attribute causal significance to other variables. To continue with the 
example of employment policy, the Commission and the Council have specified 
courses of action that might address the problems of low female employment rates 
and labour market segmentation. These include a particular conception of 
‘flexicurity’, which requires changes in Employment Protection Legislation that 
address discrepancies in employment protection for different types of contracts, 
lifelong learning policies that upgrade the skills of parents who return to work after 
taking care of family dependents and changes in social security systems that provide 
affordable access to childcare facilities (Commission, 2010; 2013; Council of the 
European Union, 2010). It can be hypothesized that if the EU can effectively induce 
change in its member-states’ employment policies, national policy makers will begin 
to consider these EU-recommended courses of action as alternatives to national 
policy. If empirical research shows that national policy makers continued to disregard 
both the policy problems and the courses of action identified at the EU level, their 
disregard should be considered disconfirming evidence for all four explanations 
presented here.  
As a final step, empirical research should establish whether national policy 
makers calculated the costs and benefits of the alternatives that they considered and, if 
so, the type of costs and benefits that they calculated. Evidence of this dimension of 
the policy-making process also has diagnostic value. The explanation based on 
naming and shaming predicts that national policy makers calculate the costs and 
benefits of EU-recommended courses of action for their re-election, while the 
explanations based on learning predict that they calculate their costs and benefits for 
policy objectives. The explanation based on peer pressure predicts that national policy 
makers do not make cost-benefit calculations and that they take EU-recommended 
courses of action because they become convinced that it is the right thing to do for 
officials of an EU member-state. If empirical research shows that policy change was 
the result of cost-benefit calculations (regardless of type), these calculations should be 
considered disconfirming evidence for the explanation based on peer pressure. If 
empirical research shows that national policy makers selected an EU-recommended 
course of action, such as improving access to childcare services because they 
calculated that it would facilitate the participation of women in the labour market or 
introducing more open-ended contracts for labour market outsiders because it would 
reduce labour market segmentation, these calculations should be considered 
disconfirming evidence for the explanation based on naming and shaming. In contrast, 
if empirical research shows that national policy makers selected such EU-
recommended courses of action because they calculated that if they had not, they 
would have endangered their re-election, these calculations should be considered 
disconfirming evidence for the explanations based on learning.23 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 In contrast to frequently under-specified analyses of mechanisms of 
Europeanization in the literature, this article has made the explanatory logic 
underlying each mechanism explicit. The guiding principle in this process of refining 
these causal mechanisms has been the need for distinctive observable implications for 
the intervening steps between EU stimuli and change in national policy, on which 
process tracing focuses. The result of this process of refinement is that none of the 
four explanations presented here are observationally equivalent. They hypothesise 
causal pathways that differ from one another with regard to at least one intervening 
step between EU stimuli and domestic change. In particular, the explanation based on 
social learning and the explanation based on peer pressure predict change in the 
definition of the policy problem, while the explanation based on instrumental learning 
and the explanation based on naming and shaming do not. The explanation based on 
social learning predicts that change in the definition of the policy problem is the result 
of new information, whereas the explanation based on peer pressure predicts that it is 
the result of normative arguments. The explanation based on instrumental learning 
predicts that national policy makers make cost-benefit calculations in terms of policy 
objectives, while the explanation based on naming and shaming predicts that they 
                                                 
23 It should be noted here that EU member-states that are subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure are 
required to submit an economic partnership programme, which describes the necessary structural 
reforms in a manner that develops their national reform programmes and is consistent with Europe 
2020 and the guidelines for the employment policies of EU member-states (see Regulation (EU) No 
473/2013). It is therefore conceivable that sanctions might be imposed on Euro area member-states that 
fail to comply with decisions, which are made within the context of an excessive deficit procedure and 
are related to employment policy. If change in national employment policy is the effect of such 
sanctions, this will be reflected in national policy makers’ cost-benefit calculations that precede policy 
change, as such sanctions will increase the financial cost of the policy previously pursued.  
make cost-benefit calculation in terms of the objective of re-election. In contrast, the 
explanation based on peer pressure predicts that national policy makers do not make 
cost-benefit calculations, but that they attempt to identify the appropriate course of 
action for a member of their community (the EU) instead.  
This article has provided detailed guidelines on how process tracing can be 
used to test the four explanations presented here empirically, using examples from 
employment policy, where the use of non-binding EU stimuli has been widespread. 
Process tracing is well-suited to establishing causality in cases of equifinality and the 
use of process tracing demonstrated here is uncommonly advanced. As both the 
intervening steps between cause and effect and the observable implications of the 
relevant mechanisms for these intervening steps have now been specified, future 
research can move from ‘historical narratives’ to ‘analytical explanations’ of policy 
change as the outcome of Europeanization. The analysis presented here can serve as a 
template for research on the Europeanization of policy areas other than employment, 
especially where EU stimuli are not binding (e.g. foreign policy or social inclusion). 
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